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ABSTRACT
In my thesis, I consider Jean Harvey’s account of moral solidarity. Harvey claims that solidarity
only occurs between people who share a personal relationship. I raise a concern regarding the
limited scope of Harvey’s account of moral solidarity. I challenge the view that one cannot
extend the concerns they have for a friend experiencing injustice to a stranger who is also
experiencing the same injustice. In order to address this concern and defend Harvey’s account of
solidarity, I offer a friendly amendment to her account. By drawing on Samuel Scheffler’s
account of relational egalitarianism, and in light of the relationships citizens may share with one
another, I expand the types of relationships that should be considered solidarity under an account
such as Harvey’s My account thus defends a more expansive view of solidarity than that of
Harvey.
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1

INTRODUCTION

While there isn’t one generally accepted account of solidarity, many accounts take a
political approach in the sense that solidarity is always against something unjust.1 Whether that
be a racist person or a systemic injustice, political solidarity is focused on people coming
together to fight against something. However, Jean Harvey’s account is distinct insofar as she
offers an account of moral solidarity. While she thinks that solidarity does involve resistance to
injustice, central to her account is that persons must have a personal relationship for solidarity to
be possible. She considers solidarity to be a moral obligation between people rather than a
reaction against some injustice. Using a social lens, Harvey considers the motivations behind
acts of solidarity as well as the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed. Harvey
argues that there is more to solidarity than just committing a helpful action. On her view,
solidarity also requires an underlying personal relationship.
In consideration of recent work on solidarity which treats solidarity as a means to address
injustice, one might think that Harvey’s view is outdated because of her emphasis on personal
relationships. In my thesis, I consider her account of solidarity and her concern with when it is
morally acceptable for someone to make a decision for another. I raise the criticism that the
scope of her account of solidarity is too narrow. By claiming that personal relationships are the
foundation for moral solidarity, some might claim that Harvey unnecessarily limits who a person
can be in solidarity with for the wrong reasons. Harvey worries about the moral risks involved in
making decisions for others. In order to defend Harvey’s account of solidarity, I suggest a
friendly amendment by appealing to Samuel Scheffler’s view of relational egalitarianism and
societal relationships in “The Practice of Equality” (2015). I consider different types of
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Take for example, Sally J. Scholz’s “Political Solidarity” (2008) and Tommie Shelby’s “Foundations of Black
Solidarity: Collective Identity or Common Oppression.” (2002)
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relationships within a society and suggest that a relationship based on civic equality is just as
acceptable as a personal relationship for moral solidarity.
My thesis takes the following format. In the first section, I layout Harvey’s conception of
moral solidarity. In the second section, I raise and discuss a counterexample against Harvey’s
view and depict the issues that underlies the counterexample. I argue that we should be able to
extend feelings that rise from injustices that personally affect us, or our loved ones, to strangers.
Finally, in an attempt to salvage moral solidarity and its use of relationships as its foundation, I
consider a conception of relationships within an egalitarian society. Using egalitarian
relationships, particularly anonymous relationships between citizens, I argue that citizens who
may not personally know each other are capable of moral solidarity due to the nature of
anonymous relationships within an egalitarian society.
1.1

Harvey on Solidarity
In “Moral Solidarity and Empathetic Understanding: The Moral Value and Scope of the

Relationship,” Harvey discusses her conception of a morally valuable solidarity. On her view,
solidarity, generally, has to do with persons being in opposition to systemic injustice (2010, 22).
She stresses that in conditions of systemic injustice, there are important differences in power
between victims of systemic oppression and the perpetrators of the system (2010, 22).2 Harvey
believes the difference in power between the victims and perpetrators of oppression make
solidarity possible between these two different parties (2010, 22). It is generally accepted that
solidarity flows from the oppressor to the oppressed or between the oppressed. However, Harvey
believes that solidarity can also flow from oppressed to oppressor (2010, 33), which will be

2

Harvey’s use of the language “victims” and “perpetrators” may come across as particularly strong however Harvey
isn’t asserting a dichotomy where people can only be victims or oppressors. She is also not assuming that victims
are the only ones who are in need of solidarity, the second point will become clearer in the next section.
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discussed in more depth later. Like many philosophers, Harvey does not offer an exact definition
of solidarity. However, she identifies some key elements.
First, solidarity involves at least two individuals or two groups: one is in solidarity
with another. Second, we are in solidarity with those suffering from immorality or
injustice, not from some natural disaster. Third, action may be involved, but there
seems at least to be agreement that action alone is not enough. No matter what the
action, if it is self-serving … solidarity is not an appropriate term to use. There is
some kind of alignment or unity or fellowship involved, although the nature of it
is a matter of debate. (2010, 22)
Harvey aims to explore solidarity through a moral lens and focuses on situations that deal
with oppression. She considers: Is solidarity morally called for? What would that look like?
Could solidarity be morally desirable? Harvey argues for two claims: 1) those in power have a
moral obligation to be in solidarity with the oppressed and 2) there is a distinction between acts
of solidarity and relationships of solidarity. Acts of solidarity, she claims, are “reflections of a
relationship of solidarity” (2010, 23). Morally speaking, acts of solidarity may be important;
however, relationships of solidarity are foundational for moral solidarity.
1.2

Alliances vs. Solidarity
Harvey thinks that alliances are distinct from relationships of solidarity (2010, 23).

People form an alliance when they act together because of a shared goal (2010, 23). With an
alliance, there may be nothing else between two groups except for their shared goal (2010, 23).
Groups can be in alliance with each other while not liking or caring for each other. She gives the
example of the US and the USSR during World War II (2010, 23). Alliances are commonly
made against a mutual enemy (2010, 23). When the shared goal is reached (e.g., the destruction
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of the enemy), the alliance will dissipate since there is no other common will or sentiment
holding the two groups together (2010, 23). That is not to say that groups have not advertised or
claimed to have positive feelings for each other. However, Harvey claims that if we look at the
larger historical picture it is easy to see that these feelings were never strong (2010, 23).
By contrast to an alliance, solidarity requires more than a common goal between two
people or parties. Harvey speaks about “the something more” within the context of co-members
of an oppressed group (2010, 24). I imagine that in discussing co-membership that Harvey
wanted to address a common view of solidarity, that it can only be amongst people who have
shared a similar suffering. Harvey acknowledges that the benefits of co-membership in an
oppressed group is “shared knowledge of the injustices involved in such oppression” (2010, 24).
She and many others believe that “such shared knowledge is an advantage in setting appropriate
goals” (2010, 24).
However, Harvey points out that co-members of an oppressed group may act out of their
own interests. If Bob calls for solidarity due to an issue he faces, but only cares for his issue
being resolved rather than everyone else who may face the same issue, then Bob isn’t in
solidarity with anyone. Morally speaking, it doesn’t matter that Bob is a co-member of an
oppressed group and may possess some shared knowledge because of it. In other words, despite
Bob’s co-membership status, his call for solidarity would not be considered solidarity in the
moral sense that Harvey is striving for. On Harvey’s view mere co-membership does not entail
solidarity. Harvey points out that all relationships, even between co-members of an oppressed
group need to be analyzed if there is to be moral solidarity.
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1.3

Relationship Between the Privileged and the Oppressed
After arguing that relationships of solidarity need not occur between members of a

particular oppressed group, Harvey describes how relationships of solidarity can occur between
the privileged and the oppressed. She thinks the main hurdle for creating such a relationship is
the difference in life experience between these different groups. The main cause of differences in
life experience between the two groups can be narrowed down to the difference in societal status
or power. Using the example of women and stalkers, Harvey points out that the privileged are
guilty of not taking the experiences of the oppressed seriously (2010, 25). She discusses a case in
which women share their concerns about stalkers and men do not understand their concern
(2010, 25). She says that their lack of understanding stems from the fact that they could not see
themselves in such situations (2010, 25). A lot of men dismissed the concerns as exaggeration or
a distraction from “real” issues like women who were actually being assaulted (2010, 25). From
this example, Harvey makes a distinction between “sheer information and empathetic
understanding” (2010, 25). With sheer information, one is not emotionally engaged with learning
about the oppressed. One need only consider again, the reaction of men in the stalking case. On
the other hand, empathetic understanding does require an emotionally involved attitude towards
learning about the oppressed.
Harvey believes that empathetic understanding can result in a type of knowledge that
changes the relationship between the privileged and the oppressed for the better (2010, 27). She
claims that knowledge about the oppressed should come from the oppressed, and that the
privileged must interact with the knowledge gained in an empathetic manner (rather than an
emotionally detached one)(2010, 27). Referring to Laurence Thomas’s Moral Deference, Harvey
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seems to agree with Thomas in that the privileged are morally obligated to learn about the
oppressed in an empathetic manner. Referring to Thomas, she states
Listening to the stories of the oppressed should not occur in a detached mode, nor
with an attitude of curiosity or ridicule, nor with some self-interested goal in
mind, but rather (quoting Thomas now) ‘letting another’s pain re-constitute one so
much so that one comes to have a new set of sensibilities—a new set of moral
lenses if you will.’ (2010, 27)
Harvey acknowledges that the privileged may be kind and well-intentioned people, like
some of the men in the stalking case, but that does not entail an understanding about the
oppressed and their situation (2010, 25). She also points out that possessing such knowledge is
not enough on its own for the privileged to be in solidarity with the oppressed. What is needed is
for people to empathetically understand the experiences of others, which is most likely to occur
in personal relationships.
1.4

Too Restrictive a Conception of Solidarity & Too Heavy a Focus on Paternalism
One view that Harvey rejects is Laurence Thomas’s idea that moral deference is required

for moral solidarity. By this, Thomas means that people should defer to the experiences of others
rather than try to understand 1) someone else’s experience which 2) they have never undergone.
If done correctly, moral deference allows for someone who is not affected by an injustice to learn
about the injustice in a way that goes beyond just reading facts about it. Rather, someone learns
about injustice, through moral deference, by witnessing the emotional response of another with
their consent. For Thomas, moral deference is an important step in living a moral life because it
sets up a person to have the morally appropriate response to someone who has been wronged
(Thomas 1993, 233).
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Harvey thinks that such deference may do more harm than good (2010, 27). She has two
major concerns with Thomas’s moral deference. First, she believes that moral deference has a
“morally dubious implication” in terms of what it requires from the oppressed (2010, 27). While
the attitude of moral deference is a good start to creating the relationship necessary for a moral
solidarity, moral deference does have a questionable implication. Harvey points out that in order
for someone to morally defer to someone else’s story, the oppressed person has to be a storyteller
and verbally articulate their story (2010, 28). However, how are we to have a solidarity with
people who are unable to share their own experiences? For people who are non-verbal or unable
to speak about their own experiences, perhaps due to trauma, making moral deference a
requirement for moral solidarity becomes an issue. Second, we should also take into account that
children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities are part of oppressed groups. Making moral
deference a requirement of moral solidarity means that we are unable to be in solidarity with
these people because they may be unable to verbally share their own stories (2010, 28). Harvey
points out the ridiculousness of the requirement that the oppressed must communicate their
stories, especially since these may be the people who need solidarity the most (2010, 28).
1.5

Protective Aid and the Kind of Learning about the Other Involved
Despite her acknowledgement of high-handed paternalism, Harvey believes that there

may be situations where it would be morally appropriate for someone to speak on behalf of
another who cannot speak for themself (2010, 29). Harvey argues for protective aid, a morally
neutral term for someone to speak about experiences they have never experienced (2010, 29).
Harvey identifies two scenarios where protective aid is morally permissible (2010, 29). The first
scenario involves some persons who are elderly and the second involves nonhuman animals. In
both scenarios, the beings are identified as being vulnerable (2010, 29) and unable to verbally
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speak for themselves. Harvey believes that concerned others are morally justified in speaking for
the others in scenarios which feature vulnerable people or animals who are unable to advocate
for themselves (2010, 29).
Harvey points out that even though a victim may be unable to articulate their needs,
people can still empathize with them (2010, 29). It is not necessary for someone to tell you that
they are uncomfortable when you can read their body language. However, Harvey is clear that
the non-victim is going to have to engage with the victim in addition to doing their own research
on the matter (2010, 30). She also points out that doing the research will be harder when the
violence against victims become more subtle or less obvious (2010, 30). For example, there will
probably be more research available about wage theft than companies gaslighting their female
employees.
Harvey acknowledges that not all victims are going to be able to speak for themselves
and articulate their own needs (2010, 30). Someone speaking on behalf of the victim, underneath
protective aid, is going to be necessary to advance the interests of these victims (2010, 30). In
other words, it will be essential for non-victims to be the ones to make the judgements necessary
for the victims that Harvey has in mind. In defending her own view against Thomas’s, Harvey
emphasizes what makes protective aid morally acceptable,
Great attention and concern is owed the victims and their suffering, but they make
no pronouncements others should defer to and there are no consultations where
the approval of the victims must be given, not because we would not wish to do
so, but because by the nature of the case it cannot be done. (2010, 30)
Harvey is clear that her view is different from Thomas’s moral deference because it
demands more from people. It is not enough, morally speaking, for one to defer to another
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person’s experience. Rather, Harvey’s view seems to demand that people act or speak for those
who may not be able to, even if the person acting has never experienced that specific wrong.
Harvey continues by acknowledging that “there is nothing in fact that places the victims in an
“authoritative” role as distinct from a morally central role” (2010, 30). Thomas’s view is limiting
because it not only requires victims to speak about their own experiences but also treats them as
the authority. In some cases, this may prevent any desirable action, especially if the victims are
unable to speak about their experiences. Harvey continues,
If actions are to be taken to change the situation of these victims, then except for
articulate adults who were once child victims, it will be on the basis of the best
judgements made by non-victims who have placed themselves in a protective
relationship with the victims. Such relationships are morally sound even though
there is always some risk of misunderstanding or misperceiving. (2010, 30)
As with all relationships, there is some risk of misunderstanding. However, Harvey
seems to imply that with Thomas’s view we make victims the authority figure on their
oppression and depending on their verbal ability that may be too much pressure. It would also
stifle a lot of action that may need to happen if it can only come from the victim. In other words,
Harvey’s view questions the need to defer to someone else’s experience when something morally
wrong happens. People do have the right to act, and Harvey may even argue that they should,
even if the moral wrong does not happen to them.
1.6

Civilized Oppression and Contributing Agents
Harvey pays special attention to civilized oppression in order to consider the oppressed

being in solidarity with the non-oppressed. Civilized oppression “refers to forms of oppression
that involve neither violence nor the use of law” (2010, 31). Contributing agents are people who
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contribute to civilized oppression without any intention to harm someone. Harvey suggests that
many forms of civilized oppression are “heavily socialized and unthinkingly sustained” (2010,
32). One example might be when a man calls his male colleague by his title, “Dr. Jones,” but
refers to his female colleague with the same credentials by their name, “Melissa.” Harvey
recognizes that contributing agents may be nice people who donate to victims of natural disaster
but would also be flabbergasted at being described as an oppressor due to unintended features of
their actions (2010, 31). She points out that the privilege of contributing agents shields them
from the effects of their oppression (2010, 31).
Harvey defends the contributing agent by pointing out that not everyone is aware of all
their habits. Returning to empathetic understanding, Harvey argues that
Empathetic understanding can sometimes be morally appropriate not only
between agents of oppression and the oppressed, but between the oppressed and at
least some who are contributing agents of oppression, not because we should
tolerate the oppression involved, but because lying behind it is a failing just about
everyone who is ruthlessly honest can lay claim to, namely, being unaware of all
our actions (2010, 33).
For example, someone can recognize the discrimination of women in a job applicant pool
but also fail to recognize their own racial discrimination in judging that same pool. Harvey
suggests that empathetic understanding is also owed to contributing agents who are trying to
change or be more self-aware. Returning to the idea of moral solidarity, Harvey claims that for
the reasons above that people are in solidarity against oppression and not oppressors because
some contributing agents deserve empathetic understanding (2010, 34). With this claim in mind,
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Harvey argues that moral solidarity should not only apply to victims of oppression but to agents
of oppression as well (2010, 33 -34).
Harvey claims that the value of moral solidarity is rooted in the relationships of the
people in solidarity with each other. Harvey states that she sees “building a relationship of
empathetic understanding as an expression of caring and respect of the victims in their own right
and it is because of that respectful caring that we are motivated to work to improve their lot”
(2010, 34). Harvey’s empathetic understanding treats the oppressed as individual humans, rather
than a tool of education meant for overcoming their oppression. For Harvey, the treatment of
others, non-humans included, is important for creating what she calls a moral community (2010.
24). Harvey’s community is a safe place for people to support each other as they become more
self-aware about their own oppressive habits which contribute to injustice. Harvey is clear that
moral solidarity is not the same as a political solidarity which would work against systematic
injustice or support the oppressed in their struggles against oppression (2010, 35). People can
provide support without being in moral solidarity with another person, only because moral
solidarity requires an emotional commitment fulfilled through empathetic understanding.
1.7

The Challenges of Moral Solidarity
Harvey stresses the challenges of moral solidarity, though she points out that “empathetic

understanding will not always be mutual, and in some cases cannot be, but it may develop even
if only one of the two parties has the ability and commitment needed to develop it” (2010, 35).
Harvey means mutual in the sense that each person in a relationship is equally contributing the
same thing or at least something equivalent in value. However, that isn’t to say that there won’t
be relationships where one person is giving more to the other person in the relationship where
moral solidarity occurs. Harvey also points out a logistic limit to empathetic understanding. We
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are not going to have empathetic understanding for everyone because we are not going to have
relationships with everyone we encounter (2010. 36). This doesn’t mean that we should not try.
Indeed, she thinks that there’s something wrong with not trying at all. However, as with any
relationship, there should be no fault if an attempt to create a relationship necessary for moral
solidarity fails. At the end of the day, the relationships for moral solidarity are all going to look
different. In either case, moral solidarity will still be necessary to build the moral community that
Harvey desires.
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2

COUNTEREXAMPLE AGAINST HARVEY’S VIEW

When reading Harvey’s view, a concern arises when looking at the necessity of a
personal relationship for moral solidarity. On her view, again, personal relationships are different
than just mere alliances where people share a goal. Rather, with personal relationships, there is a
sense of something more. Harvey does not directly state what something more entails. However,
she seems to interpret it as some sort of emotional connection that could be unique to the
relationship due to her emphasis on empathetic understanding. Another way of putting it is that
personal relationships go beyond just a shared goal. The individuals have care and concern for
each other. Hence, even after a goal is achieved, the relationship would remain and that cannot
necessarily be said for alliances. Personal relationships are central to solidarity because they are
what allow people to create the moral community Harvey desires. You cannot create a
community with other people in an alliance because you know that they may leave as soon as
they obtain what they desire.
While the necessity of personal relationships for solidarity makes sense against the
context of alliances and with a desire for a community, it still seems strange to claim that you
could not be in solidarity with someone if you did not have a personal relationship with that
same person. If anything, solidarity may be needed most in situations where you may not know
the other individual personally but that person is experiencing injustice in your society. For
example, you may care about your neighbor (John) who is a black man, and you may act in
solidarity with him (under Harvey’s view) if something were to happen to him due to police
violence or racism. However, the consideration you have for John would not extend to any other
black person in your society you see being killed on the news due to the same issue. You don’t
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have a relationship with any of these other black men being killed and cannot be in solidarity
with them under Harvey’s view.
If you are able to have solidarity with John, why shouldn’t you be able to extend that sort
of kinship with or emotion towards the man on the news who is part of your society? Extending
the feelings that occur because of your relationship with John to someone else in a similar
situation doesn’t seem to do harm to your relationship with John. If anything, it may set you up
to have the morally appropriate response, in the words of Thomas, to a wrong that has been
committed. The counterexample seems to suggest an issue with Harvey’s view about solidarity
being limited to personal relationships. It unnecessarily limits, and fails to consider, the scope of
feelings that people can have for one another despite a lack of personal connection.
Before moving on I do want to point out it might be said that this counterexample fails to
consider the main point of Harvey’s account. The purpose of moral solidarity is not to solve
issues like systemic racism or the oppression of certain people. Rather, the purpose of moral
solidarity is to build a community. How can we have a moral community with others if we treat
their experiences, or even their life, as a means to an end for some larger goal or if we don’t
know the individual personally? While I think this consideration is important, there is a way for
us to still have a moral community and achieve moral solidarity without limiting eligible
relationships to only personal ones. Harvey only considers three types of relationships: personal
ones, alliances, and co-memberships.3 To broaden the scope of Harvey’s solidarity, in terms of
who and what sorts of relationships should count towards solidarity, I will consider a different
account of how relationships should work in an egalitarian society.

3

Co-membership refers to people who may be a part of the same group (race, gender, socio-economic class, etc.)
who share similar experiences (24 Harvey). Harvey talks about co-membership in the context of “something more”
and therefore being allowed to make decisions for others within the group.
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3

CONSIDERING EGALITARIAN RELATIONSHIPS

In discussing relational egalitarianism, a view of egalitarianism based off the
relationships between people, Samuel Scheffler considers two types of relationships. He is
concerned with how personal relationships and anonymous relationships would work within an
egalitarian society. Personal relationships refer to relationships where both parties know one
another and anonymous relationships refer to the relationship that people share as citizens within
an egalitarian society despite not knowing a citizen personally. An important part of Scheffler’s
conception of relational egalitarianism is not only the relationships within a society, but how the
citizens in a society make decisions on a personal and societal level. Scheffler uses the
egalitarian deliberative constraint as the main method of making decisions within an egalitarian
society. People in both personal relationships and anonymous civic relationships act under the
egalitarian deliberative constraint when they treat other people equally and take into
consideration the different factors that may influence the other’s decision within the relationship
(2015, 25). The most common factors include values, preferences and persons needs (2015, 25).
Take for example the following scenario, imagine that Sue and Jeff are trying to decide
where to eat lunch. Jeff and Sue both have dietary restrictions. Jeff is vegan and Sue is allergic to
lettuce. When Sue and Jeff are trying to decide where to eat, Jeff is going to be constrained by
the fact Sue cannot eat lettuce, eliminating some potential lunch options such as the salad place
he was going to suggest. However, the same also applies to Sue. Sue is also limited by the fact
that Jeff is vegan, so the barbeque place she was going to suggest is no longer an option. They
end up settling on an Indian restaurant. Both Sue and Jeff were equally limited by the needs of
the other person in their relationship and neither of them had more authority than the other in
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making their lunch decision. It is important to note that no one in an egalitarian relationship has
more authority than the other person in a relationship.
Scheffler is clear that coming to a decision that satisfies both people in a personal
relationship is not easy, or even possible in all cases. He suggests a multitude of strategies for
decision-making, splitting the difference, choosing the second-best, taking turns, joint
satisfaction, trading off and separation. When a pair splits the difference, they take into
consideration what they each want individually and then choose an option in the middle.
Scheffler gives the example of a couple, one of them wants to go to Paris for three weeks, the
other one only wants to go to Paris for one week (2015, 25). The couple makes their decision by
splitting the difference and going for two weeks (2015, 25). When a pair chooses the second-best
option, both people usually have different first choices but the same second choice. Imagine that
Sue’s first choice was the barbeque place and Jeff’s first choice was the salad place. However,
they both had the Indian restaurant as their second choice. If they chose to go the Indian place,
then they used the choosing the second-best strategy. However, let’s say that Sue and Jeff could
not find a place to eat that fitted their dietary needs and that they both liked. Instead, they could
choose to take turns. Sue invited Jeff to lunch so she lets him pick where to eat, granted it fits
both of their dietary needs, and Sue will get to pick where they eat lunch next time. Joint
Satisfaction would be a strategy where Sue and Jeff both pick up lunch from their separate
number one choices but then eat together in the park. Trading off is a strategy where Sue would
get to pick where the pair ate lunch, but Jeff would then get to pick where they got coffee
afterwards. The final strategy is separation. Jeff and Sue decide not to get lunch at the same
place and choose not to eat together.

17
Scheffler gives many strategies for acting under the egalitarian deliberative constraint as
noted above. However, acting under the egalitarian deliberative constraint for societal
relationships may have to work differently due to their anonymous nature. Unlike with our
example featuring Jeff and Sue, where they are able to talk through the decision with each other
using the different strategies being suggested, decisions being made under anonymous
relationships would have to make the decision using available generalized knowledge on the
issue. Scheffler uses the example of gay marriage to explain how anonymous relationships
among citizens would work on the societal level. He states, “the interests of homosexuals in
being able to marry are just as strong as the interests of heterosexuals and, accordingly, that both
sets of interests should be accommodated in the same way in our laws and institutions” (2015,
36).
In the gay marriage example, the people who are making this decision are not reaching
out to individual people to ask them what they are thinking about marriage equality. Instead, they
are using whatever knowledge they have available about our society (laws, institutions, marriage
in general) in order to come to the conclusion that there is not only an interest in marriage
equality among some people. After having come to the conclusion, those making the decision act
under the egalitarian deliberative constraint and recognize that the interests of homosexuals need
to be respected, and this can only be done by giving them the same marriage rights as those of
heterosexual couples. In other words, under the egalitarian deliberative constraint, the interests of
gay people who desire marriage would have to be considered in the same, and equal, manner that
marriage is considered for heterosexual couples.
Returning to the idea of solidarity, under an egalitarian society like the one Scheffler
depicts, the interests of the people who need solidarity should be respected. For example, John is
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a black man who is constantly scrutinized by the police because of his skin color. In the same
society Susan, a white woman, does not suffer from the same scrutiny by the police because of
her skin color. Following Scheffler, we can understand all members of society as in an
anonymous relationship with their fellow citizens. They are responsible for considering the
values, preferences, and needs of others of fellow citizens. Members of society should
accommodate the interests of John, who is interested in not being discriminated against because
of his skin color in education, employment, places of public accommodation and the political
sphere. Unlike Harvey, who makes the assumption that if there is no personal connection, there
would be no impetus for seeking knowledge about an issue or an experience. Scheffler holds that
citizens in an egalitarian society must think about their fellow citizens and their values,
preferences and needs as such. In other words, citizens in an egalitarian society may be
constantly acquiring knowledge about the needs of others, while others do the same for them,
due to the egalitarian deliberative constraint. I think that once you begin to constantly consider
the consequences of any decision you make for another person in your society, or in other words
extend empathetic understanding to your fellow citizens, there can be an established relationship
to a complete stranger through genuine consideration for one another.
For example, imagine that you hear a story on the local news about a rise in shop lifting
in the area you live in. It catches you by surprise that the number one thing being stolen is
diapers and baby formula. You have no idea who the people shop lifting from the local stores
are, but you think it’s absolutely ridiculous that these parents have no means to provide for their
own children other than through theft. You understand, and agree with some feminists, that
caretaking is both necessary and valuable work within a society. There needs to be someone
taking care of children and their needs in a household. You also believe that caretakers should
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have the necessary resources to take care of the needs of their children or dependents, while
being fairly compensated for their work. You talk with your friends about this news story. They
share your concerns about the story and the implications it has on your society. You might worry
that caretakers do not have (enough) access to adequate resources that would allow them to care
for their children and now have to resort to theft in order to do so. You all decide, in an effort to
prevent theft and help parents in need, to start a charity drive that focuses on gathering needed
materials (baby clothes, diapers, baby formula and food, etc.) for parents who may not be able to
afford them. You decide to donate to local women’s shelters and homeless shelters the materials
you are able to gather.
I think you can claim that there is a mutual relationship between the people who are
organizing a charity drive and the people who are in the unfortunate situation of needing to steal
formula for their baby in this local area. While the donors won’t know who the parents are,
making this relationship an anonymous one, chances are many of the people who helped with
charity drive are parents themselves. These parents can empathize with how hard it is to take
care of babies and can imagine how much harder parenting is when you don’t have enough
money to feed your own children. While the relationship between the two parties is anonymous
since they don’t know each other personally, it still seems strange to say that there is no
meaningful connection between these different sets of people. They both share traits in common
such as being parents and living in the same area. Another factor that connects these strangers
together is their respect for each other as equal citizens within a society. The person within our
example is able to see the news story as something that endangers equality within their society.
Rather than treating those who need to steal as the threat to equality in their society, they are able
to recognize that caretakers are suffering from a lack of resources. While that may not be
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enough on its own to create a personal relationship between strangers, I do believe it should be
enough to create a relationship based on empathetic understanding between two equal citizens.
There can be emotional connections in anonymous relationships and Scheffler’s account of
relational egalitarianism does a good job of creating a foundation for it.
While there is room to interpret the need for an egalitarian society as a shared goal
amongst equal citizens, making the anonymous relationship they share only an alliance, I don’t
think this interpretation necessarily holds. If achieving an egalitarian society was a simple goal,
where once obtained that was the end of it, this interpretation would have some hold. However, I
think equality in an egalitarian society is not something that can be both achieved and maintained
without constant involvement. For example, pretend there were two countries in an alliance that
had the shared goal of assassinating a dictator. This goal is simple in the sense that it can be
achieved through one event, the death of the dictator. I think equality in an egalitarian society is
a far more complex goal, where sure it can be achieved between two allies, but it needs to be
maintained through consistent efforts through personal relationships or the egalitarian
deliberative constraint. The need to maintain equality between two people, or the members of an
equal society goes beyond just achieving a goal. It in fact demands more from the citizens. There
is an understanding that equality will only occur as long as the citizens maintain it within an
egalitarian society and I think that creates room for a relationship and a connection between
citizens that goes beyond what an alliance can provide. Harvey requires empathetic
understanding and Scheffler relies on the egalitarian deliberative constraint in order to create the
desired relationship between equal citizens that is necessary for solidarity. Both accounts rely on
citizens relating to one another in a way that isn’t necessary for alliances and actually prioritizes
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the relationship over any material end goal. In fact, with alliances, the goal shared has nothing to
do with the relationship between the parties.
Now, are the emotions created from an anonymous relationships going to be as strong
from the emotions of a personal relationship? No. People tend to have stronger reactions or
feelings towards matters that are more personal because they are able to see how an issue directly
impacts them or someone they love. However, that shouldn’t make any sort of solidarity that
stems from an anonymous relationship any lesser than one from a personal relationship. People
should be allowed to act against any wrongs committed even if it does not personally affect them
out of a sense of an equal citizenship. It should be enough that someone else has experience a
wrong and that someone else wants to act against it within an egalitarian society, if only to
maintain the equality of a society. There is a sense of kinship that can bond two strangers in a
society and acting against an inequality that they both oppose can reinforce that bond. Such
mutual consideration can provide the something more that Harvey desired for solidaristic
relationships.
There are two potential points of contention when it comes to my use of Scheffler’s
relational egalitarianism in order to broaden the scope of Harvey’s solidarity. First, one might
worry that the requirement of personal relationships in order to have solidarity does not appear to
be compatible with the anonymous nature of societal relationships. Harvey’s account of moral
solidarity considers the right of people to make decisions for others with, and without, a personal
relationship. She only finds it permissible for a person to make decisions for other under the
umbrella of protective aid where people should act for others when they cannot act for
themselves. The second point of contention focuses on the manner in which information about
the society is obtained. For Harvey, she requires empathetic understanding when it comes to
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acquiring information about issues such as oppression. Scheffler only seems to rely on
generalized assumptions in order to make societal decisions. While both points seem to suggest
an incompatibility with Harvey and Scheffler’s view, there is actually no conflict between either
of their views.
3.1

First Point of Contention: The Incompatibility of Solidarity and Anonymous
Relationships
As discussed earlier, Harvey’s account of solidarity requires personal relationships. One

cannot be in solidarity with another that they do not know, nor would they be justified making
decisions for others without a personal relationship. On the other hand, Scheffler allows people
to make decisions for their society without a personal relationship. While it seems that these two
points should conflict, making Harvey’s solidarity and Scheffler’s relational egalitarianism
incompatible, they actually don’t conflict. There is far more nuance with Scheffler’s view on
societal and anonymous relationships than the person making the objection of incompatibility is
assuming. The person is falsely assuming that if one does not have a personal relationship with
another, they do not have any relationship with that same person. Under Scheffler’s relational
egalitarianism, that just isn’t true. Not having a personal relationship with someone could instead
suggest that a person may just have a societal relationship with someone they do not personally
know. Such a relationship is one based on shared values, commitments and understanding of
society as being made up of equal and fellow citizens. Regardless of whether or not a person
knows all the citizens in their society, each member of the society is going to live in accordance
with these key features of the relationship which do require concern and respect for other
members of their society.
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Another factor to consider when it comes to Harvey’s solidarity is that Harvey does allow
for protective aid, which allows people to act on behalf of those who cannot act for themselves.
While Harvey’s personal relationship requirement may seem limiting, she also recognizes that
people should not have to wait for someone, for example a victim of an injustice, to demand for
justice in order for other people to act against a wrong. I believe this is distinct from acting on
someone’s behalf against a wrong. If a wrong is clearly committed, we do not have to treat the
victim as the only person who is allowed to demand for change. This fact in conjunction with
how Scheffler characterizes relationships amongst equal citizens should alleviate the concern for
an incompatibility between Scheffler’s account of relational egalitarianism and Harvey’s account
of solidarity. Both accounts are concerned for others and allow people to act against injustices
regardless of having to personally know someone.
3.2

Second Point of Contention: The Acquisition of Information for Decision Making
As previously stated, when two people in a personal relationship are making a decision

both people have access to individualized information about the other person in the relationship.
Individualized information often looks like knowing a person’s individual preferences, needs,
values, etc. and does not occur for decisions being made at the societal level through anonymous
relationships. Due to the large amount of people affected by societal decisions, it is unlikely for
someone making such a large decision to have access to individualized information from every
person who may be affected by the decision (37). In other words, if a group of people are making
a decision for an entire society, they do not have access to individualized information from every
single person of that society. Instead, when making the decision-making process, people will
have to rely on their own generalizations about their society, such as we saw earlier with the
marriage equality example (36). Depending on who is chosen to make the decision, people
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relying on generalizations in order to make a decision for the entire population poses a concern,
especially if the generalizations are inaccurate.
Harvey is clear that her account of solidarity requires empathetic understanding. Having
access to data about oppression is not the same thing as understanding and genuinely
empathizing with the effects of oppression on minority groups. I think this may be the reason she
strongly emphasizes personal relationships. It is easier to emphasize when you have a personal
relationship with someone else. However, it would be a mistake to believe that personal
relationships are required in order to have empathetic understanding.
Consider an example within Scheffler’s model of a relational egalitarian society where a
group of people are making a decision for an entire society. Assume that in the decision-making
group the people who will be most impacted by the decision being made are not a part of the
decision-making group. While in Scheffler’s society generalized knowledge may be enough for
making decisions because everyone is under the hold of the egalitarian deliberative constraint,
the same would not apply in our current society. Generalized knowledge about the people
impacted is not going to ensure that disenfranchised people will obtain whatever resources they
need, especially if those in the group making decisions for the society already benefit from
holding more resources than others. It should also be noted that depending on who is within the
decision-making group, the group may possess outdated or biased generalized knowledge about
their own society, especially if not everyone is involved in the decision-making process.
This example raises a valid point. Scheffler’s standard of knowledge for making
decisions at the societal level is not demanding enough. We can respond to this concern without
having to suppose personal relationships are necessary for empathetic understanding. For
example, we could require that generalized assumptions made by the society need to be backed
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with empirical evidence before allowing people to act on said information. I would also like to
go a step farther and caution against requiring personal relationships in order to act on or make
decisions regarding issues of injustice. People who believe that personal relationships are
necessary for solidarity may fall prey to the idea that they are only justified in acting against
issues of injustice if they, or some they personally know, are affected by it. One should not need
to have a personal relationship with another person in order to act against any injustice. That is
not to say that having a personal relationship with a person will make it easier to act against
injustice. I resist the claim that such relationships are a necessary condition for being in
solidaristic relationships. I would also like to reiterate a concern that was introduced by Harvey
earlier when it comes acquiring information for the decision making process. We should be wary
of attempting to obtain empathetic understanding through demanding that people share their
traumatic experiences. Just as Harvey suggests, not everyone is verbally able to or required to
share those experiences in order to see action against injustice.
Returning to the original counterexample against Harvey’s account of solidarity, while it
may seem problematic that one can only be in solidarity with John (the black man with whom
one might have a personal relationship), we need to be thinking about solidarity in a larger
context. Solidarity as Harvey is defining it is not just standing with a cause or disenfranchised
people. If that was the case, solidarity would not require relationships of any sort. Rather,
solidarity sometimes involves making decisions for these people when they are unable to make
these decisions for themselves. Harvey limits the scope of who is allowed to make decisions for
others by focusing on whether or not the person in need of help is able to help themselves. By
using Scheffler’s relational egalitarianism as a basis, I have expanded the scope of acceptable
decision making for others by grounding these decisions under the egalitarian deliberative
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constraint within an egalitarian society. People within in an egalitarian society can make
decisions for others, even without personal relationships, when wrongs are committed that harm
the equality between citizens. People do not need to be personally affected by a wrong to take
action against it.

4

CONCLUSION

I argue that we should accept Harvey’s account of solidarity as it manifests itself under
Scheffler’s egalitarian society with a suggestion. A person, or the decision-making group may
not have a personal relationship with every single person in their society in order to be justified
in making a decision for the collective or another member in their egalitarian society.
Anonymous relationships would benefit from being treated more along the lines as societal
relationships, where people do not need to personally know one another in order to believe that
everyone within their own society should be treated equally. While not as easily justifiable as
decision making under personal relationships, where people are easily validated through a
personal connection, decision making under societal relationships should still fall under the
umbrella of solidarity.
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